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During the period of 1976-1980, the Argentine peso suffered a "real"
appreciation against the U.S. dollar of about 100 percent (see table 9.1).
This phenomenon is also noticeable if one takes into account the esti-
mates of Rodriguez and Sjaastad (1979), which suggest that part, but not
all, of the reason is that the "long-run" equilibrium real exchange rate
also appreciated during the same period.
One possible reaction to these facts is to interpret the difference
between the actual and long-run equilibrium exchange rate as an indica-
tion of short-run "disequilibrium," and then build up models to explain
it. This was the course followed by Rodriguez (1979) and Dornbusch
(1980). The former assumed adaptive (nonrational) expectations, while
Dornbusch assumed that there is inertia in the actual rate of inflation or,
more formally, that the rate of inflation is a "state" variable. In both
models a reduction in the rate of devaluation (the policy explicitly under-
taken since January 1979) appreciates the real exchange rate. This is so
because the papers assume that the price of tradables is proportional to
the nominal exchange rate; thus, in Dornbusch (1980) the implication is
immediate because the growth rate of the price of tradables would be
reduced, whereas the price growth rate of nontradables is, by assump-
tion, given in the short run; in Rodriguez (1979), on the other hand,
perfect capital mobility implies that a lower rate of devaluation results in
a lower domestic nominal rate of interest. Since inflationary expectations
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Source: Same as table 9.2; (a) U.S. Wholesale Price Index times the peso/dollar exchange
rate divided by CPI of Argentina; (b) same denominator as in (a), but numerator is 0.7 times
Agriculture-Cattle Raising Price Index plus 0.3 times Import Price Index.
are given in the short run, we also have a fall in the real interest rate that,
by stimulating aggregate demand, appreciates the real exchange rate.
Another way of reacting to these facts is to search for "general equilib-
rium" explanations where behavioral equations could, in principle, be
derived from optimization processes and where individuals have rational
expectations (in the sense used in the current macroeconomic work; see,
e.g., Sargent and Wallace 1975).
1 This is the type of model that we will
discuss in this paper.
To familiarize the reader with the Argentine economy from March
1976 (when the military coup took place), section 9.1 will be an outline of
the main policies and the available empirical evidence for that period.
This will also serve as background and motivation for the models of the
next section.
Section 9.2 will start with a brief review of the important work of
Rodriguez and Sjaastad (1979) on which, as noted before, rests the idea
that the real value of the peso lies above its long-run level. Then we will
present essentially three types of models. The first one studies the impact
of a portfolio shift from dollars to domestic capital (land); the second
model emphasizes the substitutability of domestic and foreign monetary
assets. Finally, the third model examines the effects of the announced
exchange rate policy's lack of credibility on the minds of the public.
The main message of this paper is that there are simple, realistic,
general equilibrium models that have the potential to account for at least
some of the divergence between the actual and the long-run equilibrium
real exchange rates. How much these models can explain, however, is an
open question that must await further study.
9.1 Some Stylized Facts
The explicit objectives of the military government were to substantially
reduce the rate of inflation from world-record levels and to start a process
of trade and banking liberalization. All of this was supposed to take place
1. Dornbusch (1980) would also belong to this class of models if one could find a
rationale for his price-setting equation.201 Trying to Stabilize: The Case of Argentina
without causing a sizable increase in the rate of unemployment.
2 To carry
out these almost-impossible sounding objectives, J. A. Martinez de Hoz
was put at the helm of the Ministry of Economics; he, in turn, appointed
Adolfo Diz as head of the central bank.
3
Despite the stability of the economics team and a visible trend toward
fulfilling the original objectives, economic policy was not always clearly
understood by the public. Part of the reason for this "lack of clarity" was,
of course, that at the beginning the new administration was engaged in
both dismantling long-inherited price distortions and trying to substan-
tially cut a large budget deficit (the fiscal deficit in 1975 was over 12
percent of GNP and revenue was less than 25 percent of expenditure), a
program that was hard to carry out by means of across-the-board, clear-
cut measures, especially given the above-mentioned unemployment con-
straints. But, in addition, there is some consensus among economic
observers that an important source of private-sector confusion also had to
do with the minister's admitted bias toward discretionary policy ("prag-
matism" in the Argentine jargon).
The period from March 1976 to December 1978 was by far the most
turbulent in terms of radical changes; the one that was most completely
accomplished was the decontrol of the banking system. The latter de-
veloped from a system with very negative interest rates, where the central
bank was the only "owner" of deposits (except for savings banks, "finan-
cieras," that were heavily controlled), to a situation where interest rates
on time deposits were left to fluctuate in response to market forces, banks
were free to choose their loan portfolios, and barriers on international
capital mobility were substantially lifted.
The second important change during that period (1976-1978) was the
(partial) elimination of wage, price, and trade controls. Price controls
were practically removed in April 1976. Guidelines on minimum wages
were kept, but by all accounts, the latter became nonbinding (i.e., the
market equilibrium wage lay above the minimum). Subsidies on nontra-
ditional exports were phased out as was also the case with taxes on
traditional exports (meat, wheat, etc.). Import tariffs were substantially
reduced with the exception of steel, which is considered to be a strategic
sector. Apparently, however, by December 1978, tariff reductions did
little more than just eliminate redundant protection.
Monetary policy was perhaps the least clear aspect o,f the economic
program during this period. It started with an inexplicitly defined "crawl-
2. Apparently unemployment was seen as a potential breeding ground for the guerrilla
groups that were still very active and powerful in 1976.
3. They, as most of the other officials appointed in 1976, kept their positions until the
official end of their appointments (March 1981), a fact that, as noted by De Pablo (1980),
makes this by far the longest-lived economics team in recent Argentine history. According
to De Pablo, from 1945 to 1976 the average term of a minister of economics was 347 days,
and only eleven out of thirty-two ministers lasted for more than a year.202 Guillermo A. Calvo
ing peg" system and finally converged, in 1978, with an equally unclear
"dirty float" regime. These points are worth keeping in mind, for while
we observe a decline in the fiscal deficit and in the growth rate of the
monetary base, these otherwise important components of a stabilization
program are bound to lose their effectiveness, or to operate in perverse
ways, if economic agents do not understand the (implicit) policy rules.
4
The period from January 1979 to December 1980 was relatively calm in
terms of fundamental structural changes. In addition, in contrast to the
previous period (1976-1978), monetary policy became relatively trans-
parent. Beginning in January 1979, the government announced the future
exchange rate until October of that year (with a declining rate of devalua-
tion) and promised to continue with that type of policy until March 1981
(when a new administration would take charge). Although in January
1979 a prefixed schedule for the dollar exchange rate was not set for after
October, it was understood that from then on the rate of devaluation was
going to steadily decline until it reached zero by March 1981. Restrictions
on capital mobility were relaxed further, although an important im-
perfection was kept: except for some minimal amounts, foreign capital
could not be repatriated until it had been in the country for a year. This is
important because the administration never prefixed the exchange rate
for more than six months. In July 1980, however, free capital mobility
was allowed (practically). Until November 1980 the prefixed rate was
fully honored. From December, there was a slight upward revision of the
"rate" of devaluation relative to that announced in July 1980 (it went
from 1 percent to about 2 percent a month).
5
As seen in table 9.2, from 1977 to 1980 the annual (November-to-
November) CPI inflation rate fell from 177 percent to 89 percent, the
sharpest decrease being in 1980 (particularly in the last months). This
contrasts with the rate of devaluation that went from 117 percent to 27
percent. As a result, all reasonable estimates of the "real" exchange rate
show a marked decline over the entire period (see table 9.1). For future
reference, the appreciation of the real rate started before January 1979.
4. Here we come across an example of the "pragmatism" that prevailed, especially
during the 1976-1978 period.
5. A more precise chronology is as follows (I owe this to De Pablo): On December 20,
1978, the government announced the dollar exchange rate for the period from 1-1-79 to
8-31-79; on April 10, such schedule was extended up to the end of 1979. In October 1979, the
rate was announced up to (virtually) March 1980, after which it was understood that the rate
of devaluation of a given month was going to be the same of the previous one minus 0.2
percent. September 1980 marks what, with the benefit of hindsight, we might call "the
beginning of the end," because contrary to what was declared in December 1978, the rate of
devaluation for October and succeeding months was announced to be 1 percent per month;
however, in December the "ask" rate was allowed to grow at 2 percent, while the "bid" rate
was kept as 1 percent per month. Finally, toward the end of the Videla-Martinez de Hoz
administration (2-2-81 to be exact), the peso was unexpectedly devalued by 10 percent and a





















Source: C.E.M.A., Seminario de discusion sobre economia Argentina; data compiled on
the basis of information of the Central Bank of Argentina, Instituto Nacional de Estadisti-
cas y Censos, International Finance Statistics, and other sources. These are percentage rates
as of November of each year.
As measured by published GDP figures, the cost of the program in
terms of lost output appears to be quite substantial. The annual growth
rate during the 1974-1980 period dropped to 1.1 percent compared to a
secular 4 percent (see table 9.3). However, these figures are not very
reliable because the base is 1960—a fact that may have tended to under-
estimate changes in output associated with the above-mentioned struc-
tural changes—and because the rate of unemployment apparently fell
from 4.8 percent in April 1976 to 2 percent in April 1980 (De Pablo
1980).
6
A remarkable development over most of the period was the sizable
increase of international reserves held by the central bank. As seen in
table 9.4, reserves increased more than seven times from April 1976 to
April 1978. The rate considerably diminished over the next two years but
was still relatively large (over 12 percent per annum). However, from
April to October 1980, a period that started with the collapse of three
major private banks, reserves fell by about 12 percent; this declining
tendency continued toward the end of the year.
Two forces seem to be operating here. During 1976-1977 there is likely
to have been a portfolio shift from foreign to domestic assets, because the
government made it very clear from the beginning that private property
would be fully respected; later the interest rates were decontrolled, thus
widening the set of attractive domestic assets. Prior to March 1976 the
menu of assets held by the public consisted mainly of goods and foreign
assets (for most people just dollars in safety boxes). With this in mind, it is
not implausible that a large proportion of the less than 5 billion dollar
increase of reserves from April 1976 to April 1978 just came from private
portfolios of Argentines, since it only represents about 20 percent of
6. It should be noted, however, that even leaving capital accumulation effects aside, one
could conceive of a situation where GDP stagnates while unemployment falls. This would
be the case, for example, if wages became downward flexible (by the elimination of labor
unions) and firms were price setters which preferred to underutilize capacity. See section
























































Source: International Financial Statistics and Central Bank of Argentina; (a), (b), and (c)
as of December of each year; (c) deflated by the Wholesale Price Index; (d) as of October.
GNP.
7 Another possible reason for the accumulation of reserves is that,
especially after 1978, the rate of growth of the central bank's credit to the
government (the main component of domestic credit) was held consider-
ably below the rate of inflation and, more fundamentally, also below the
prefixed rate of devaluation (see tables 9.2 and 9.4).
8
After the banking reform (last quarter of 1977), interest rates skyrock-
eted; the real lending rate for December 1977 reached the record equiva-
lent annual level of 194 percent (see table 9.5). The real rate was positive
for 1978 and 1980 and near zero for 1979.
9.2 The Road to an Explanation
In view of the previous description, it is clear that the central question
we ought to answer is: What are the main reasons for the slow conver-
gence of the inflation rate to the prefixed inflation rate (plus the interna-
tional inflation rate)? This question has already been partially answered
in an important paper by Rodriguez and Sjaastad (1979). They start from
the observation that the equilibrium real exchange rate is, inter alia, a
7. To get this estimate, we conservatively assumed that per capita income was $1,000
(U.S.).

















































































Source: Same as table 9.1, obtained by subtracting the monthly rate of growth of wholesale
prices from the nominal interest rate of table 9.5.
function of the domestic terms of trade (i.e., international terms of trade
adjusted by tariffs and subsidies), and thus, they run a regression of the
latter against the former. An implication of their estimates is that, for
instance, the removal of an export tax will tend to appreciate, while the
reduction of a binding import tariff will tend to depreciate the equilib-
rium real exchange rate. As noted earlier, both experiments were tried.
If, as argued above, tariffs were reduced to eliminate redundant protec-
tion, then their paper would imply that there was a downward shift in the
real exchange rate. In a fixed exchange rate regime this would take the
form of an increase in the inflation rate. As reported by the authors, and
by extrapolations for 1980 made by C. A. Rodriguez, however, the price
level appears to be even higher than warranted by their formulas. Esti-
mates vary, but their analysis suggests that by the end of 1980 the price
level was at least 15 percent above its long-run, equilibrium level.
Another, more fundamental, reason why the Rodriguez-Sjaastad
analysis could not tell us the whole story is that their estimates are based
on Cochrane-Orcutt techniques, suggesting that there exist some other,
perhaps slow-moving, variables crucial to the process.
In what follows we will present several models that try to account for
some of the "missing" variables in a general-equilibrium, rational-
expectations context. It should be made clear from the outset that the
models do not intend to capture all the aspects of the Argentine
experience.
9.2.1 The Portfolio Shift Model
The first model tries to capture the impact effect of a portfolio shift,
like the one mentioned in section 9.1. More specifically, here we will be206 Guillermo A. Calvo
concerned with shifts away from foreign and toward domestic physical
assets.
Let us assume that there are three assets: land (inelastically supplied),
domestic money, and foreign money (M and /, respectively). Thus,
wealth in terms of foreign exchange, a, satisfies
(1) a = z + q,
where
(2) z=—+f v ) E J
is "financial" wealth, q is the price of land in terms of foreign exchange,
and E is the exchange rate (i.e., price of foreign currency in terms of
domestic money). We assume the existence of tradable and nontradable
goods, no international inflation, and that the country is "small" in
international markets; thus, the domestic price of tradables could be
identified with E.
Given that we wish to emphasize the substitutability between land and
foreign assets and that, as shown in table 9.4, the stock of real, high-
powered money was relatively constant, we will assume that the demand
for money is inelastic with respect to the interest rate(s). Assuming that
the relevant price level is the price of nontradables,
9 P, we get
M
(3) — = a, a constant.
P
Furthermore, we assume that
(4) qlf=k.
This is simply a portfolio demand equation. To simplify the exposition,
we will assume k to be exogenous. However, straightforward extensions
will be briefly mentioned at the end.
We assume (see Calvo and Rodriguez 1977 for a similar procedure):
1
0
CH(p, a) = demand for nontradable
— + (or "home") goods,
CT(p, a) = demand for tradable goods,
= supply of nontradables,
+
yr(p)
 = supply of tradables.
9. Results are qualitatively the same as long as in the relevant "price level" P has a
positive weight.
10. Signs underneath an argument indicate those of the corresponding partial deriva-
tives.207 Trying to Stabilize: The Case of Argentina
In equilibrium,
(5) CH(p,a)=yH(p),
and thus, at equilibrium,
(6) P = v(a).
+
We will study the case where E is prefixed (although it may vary over
time). Thus, assuming that foreigners do not demand domestic land,
1
1 it
follows that financial wealth, z, is at any time, t, a "state" or predeter-
mined variable at t. Hence, by (l)-(6),
(7) a = z +fk = z + (z- <xp)k = z(l + k) - av(a)k.
By equations (6) and (7), a is a function of z and k at equilibrium, and if/,





We immediately see, by (7) and (8b), that a shift way from foreign
exchange and into land increases/?, that is, appreciates the real exchange
rate. Furthermore, since initially z is predetermined, (1) implies that the
value of land will rise. Also, by (2) and (3),
(9) z = ap+f,
and thus, the rise in p implies a fall in /: the private sector will have
exchanged foreign for domestic currency leading to accumulation of
reserves by the central bank.
In other words, in trying to shift from foreign exchange to land, the
public raises the price of land and, consequently, wealth goes up. The
latter, in turn, increases the demand for nontradables, leading to an
increase in the price level, and thus, to a rise in the demand for domestic
currency. The end result is that the central bank accumulates reserves
even when originally the public was interested in land, not in domestic
money.
To study the dynamics, let us assume that domestic credit grows at the
rate eM (where e = EIE = rate of devaluation). Thus,
(10) i=yT(p)-CT(p,a).
Recalling (6), our assumptions have the plausible implication that p is
11. This is not an important constraint unless foreigners own all the land.208 Guillermo A. Calvo
invariant across steady states.
1
2 Since, by equation (6), p is an increasing
function of a and, by equation (8a), a is an increasing function of z, we can
use (10) to obtain a closed stable system. Thus, after the initial apprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate, p will start to fall back to its long-run
equilibrium.
Let us denote by Rt the stock of reserves at the central bank at t. Let us
denote by R~ and M~ the stocks of reserves and money supply, respec-
tively, before the portfolio shift, which is the subject of our analysis (i.e.,
the increase of k). Hence, under our assumptions we have
(lla)
 Mo-M- = RQ_R-
and
(lib) Rt^Mi-eMi = llMi V Et Et dt\Et
Therefore,




But since a change in k was shown to leave steady state/? unchanged, it
follows that, if the system started at steady state,
(14) T^-^- >
as^°°-
Consequently, by (lla), (12), and (14),
(15) Rt^R~ , asr^oo.
The above arguments have shown, assuming that before the increase of
k the system was at a rest point, that the stock of reserves at the central
bank will in the long run be invariant with respect to k. Since it can be
shown that long-run z decreases with k, it follows, by (9) and steady state
invariance of/?, that/ will fall. Therefore, in the long run the country as a
whole will hold less foreign currency than prior to the portfolio change.
To summarize, the model shows that a portfolio shift as suggested by
the data explains a temporary appreciation of the real exchange rate and
an accumulation of reserves on the part of the central bank (also tempo-
12. This is plausible in the present context because these models are intended to explain
temporary departures from the long-run levels of the real exchange rate.209 Trying to Stabilize: The Case of Argentina
rary). One could also show in this model that, even at steady state,
reserves would accumulate (decumulate) if the rate of expansion of
domestic credit is held below (above) the rate of devaluation (another
feature of the Argentine plan).
Notice that in this model a change in the rate of devaluation has no
"real" effect. This is essentially the result of our assuming that the
demand for money is inelastic with respect to the nominal interest rate.
This type of effect, however, will be captured by our next model.
Before closing this section, we would like to sketch a possible extension
to the case where k is variable. A simple way would be to make k a
function of the rate of return of land in terms of foreign exchange. With
rationality, the latter is a function of land rental (a function of p in a
two-sector model) and capital gains, q. In this fashion, the system can
now be expressed by a pair of differential equations in z and q, where q0 is
determined by the usual saddle-path condition. The analysis now pro-
ceeds along similar lines as those in Calvo and Rodriguez (1977).
9.2.2 The Currency Substitution Model
In this model we assume, together with the "currency substitution"
literature (see Kouri 1976; Calvo and Rodriguez 1977), that the menu of
assets consists only of domestic and foreign currencies (M and/). We
have in mind a situation where the two monies can be used for transaction
purposes, but because of, say, legal constraints they are not perfect
substitutes.
A possible model strategy is to assume that monies are arguments in
utility functions and to proceed from there. This line was extensively
explored in Calvo (1980). For the sake of simplicity, and without losing
the central qualitative features of the above-mentioned model, I will "tell
the story" starting from demand functions.
The production side is assumed to be the same as in section 9.2.1. The
demand side is slightly changed in the following manner:
Let us define income, y by
(16) y = yT + yHp,
and "liquidity adjusted" disposable income, y
d, by
(17) y
d = H(m,f)+y-em + q,
where
(18a) m = M/E,
(18b) e = £/£,
g is government lump-sum transfers, and H is a function reflecting the
"liquidity services" of the two monies. Johnson (1967) appears to be the
first one to suggest that liquidity services should be included in the210 Guillermo A. Calvo
concept of disposable income (see also Fischer 1972). We assume H to be
concave and increasing in both arguments and to exhibit decreasing
marginal' 'productivities."
1
3 The term em accounts for the depreciation of
domestic money in terms of foreign currency.
At each moment of time individuals are assumed to maximize y
d
subject to the wealth constraint that now becomes
(19) a = m+f.
The next step is to assume that the demand functions depend nega-
tively on p, as in section 9.2.1, and positively on (maximum) y
d (pre-
viously we assumed that a was the other argument besides p). Home
market equilibrium is now obtained when
(20) CH(p,y
d)=yH(p),
which implies that at equilibrium
(21) P
 d
(compare this with equation [6]).
Now we are ready to study the effect of a once-and-for-all fall in e (a
dramatization of the Argentine plan that started January 1979). Obvi-
ously, by the "envelope theorem" initial y
d will take an upward jump if
ra>0 (which we, of course, assume) and g remains unchanged. By
equation (16), this leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
However, if in order to preserve the invariance of steady state p we
assume, as in section 9.2.1, that
(22) zm = g,
the impact effect on p becomes ambiguous. Although one could follow
the lines of Calvo (1980) to resolve the ambiguity in terms of empirically
meaningful concepts, we will content ourselves here to point out a
special, but interesting, case where initial g goes up when de<0.
Suppose we start from a steady state where inflation (e) is so high that
seigniorage from inflation (em) increases when inflation is diminished.
This is the type of situation emphasized by Friedman (1971). That is to
say,
(23) d(em)/de<0.
As before, de<0 implies dy
d>0, if g is constant. But now since (22)
holds, we have by (23) that g rises, implying a further increase in y
d—all
of which results, by (21), in a rise of initial p.
u
13. More generally H should also be made a function of p to reflect the use of monies to
transact home goods.
14. This is not intended to be a rigorous proof. However, the reader can easily convince
himself of this result by laying out the dynamics of the model.211 Trying to Stabilize: The Case of Argentina
Another interesting experiment is to study the implications of lowering
minimum cash reserves of banks which, as indicated above, was one of
the ingredients of Argentina's financial reform.
A simple way to handle the question is to think of m as high-powered
money (in terms of foreign exchange). Letting X denote the "money
multiplier," it is natural to rewrite the "liquidity services" function, H, as
follows:
(24) H(\m,f).
Using the latter in equation (17), we can answer the question we posed.
Clearly, again by the "envelope theorem," a rise in X leads ceteris
paribus to an increase of initial y
d and, hence, p. One can show that the
latter holds true if (17) is assumed and if H is homogeneous of degree one
(not an unreasonable assumption).
9.2.3 The Credibility Model
In section 9.1 we put a great deal of emphasis on the lack of clarity and
credibility that seemed to have prevailed during several subperiods of the
stabilization plans. In 1980, for example, there is a sizable spread be-
tween the U.S. prime rate plus actual devaluation and the domestic
nominal interest rate, suggesting that people were expecting a rate of
devaluation larger than had been announced (see table 9.6). So far,
however, our models have not incorporated these features.
To keep the discussion within reasonable limits, we will discuss only a
special case of the credibility problem where people do not believe that















Risk Premium: Spread between Domestic

































































Source: Same as table 9.1. Calculated by subtracting from table 9.5 the ten-day prime rate
plus the rate of devaluation.212 Guillermo A. Calvo
Furthermore, we will assume that this is the only aspect of the stabiliza-
tion "package" which is subject to disbelief.
In the first place, disbelief about preannounced e does not necessarily
have real effects. One example is the model of section 9.2.1. Another,
which is perhaps more interesting because it does not make the assump-
tion that the demand for money is inelastic, is as follows:
Imagine that the demand for home goods takes the following form:
(25) CH(p,rJ,
where r, the (ex ante) "real" rate of interest, satisfies
(26) r = i
where i is the nominal interest rate, and (P/P)
e is the expected rate of
inflation of home goods. Assuming perfect capital mobility, we get
(27) i = i*+e,
where /* and e
e are the rest-of-the-world nominal interest rate and the
expected rate of devaluation. Thus, denoting the expected growth of p by
(plp)
e we get, in equilibrium,
(28) CH[pJ*-{plp)
e]=yH{p).
Making the natural assumption that
(29) p=p
e,
we can, by (28) and (29), obtain a differential equation for expected/?; if,
as usual, we single out the stationary solution as the one corresponding to
"rationality," then we see that the real exchange rate is not affected by
changes in the expected rate of devaluation (incidentally, notice that the
stationary solution is locally unstable, yielding uniqueness).
Intuitively, what happens in this economy when people expect a higher
rate of devaluation, for example, is that the nominal interest rate and the
expected rate of inflation will rise in the same amount as e
e does. Hence,
the real interest rate remains constant and equilibrium/? does not change.
Furthermore, in the context of section 9.2.2, a rise in e
e has ambiguous
results for the same reasons that a change in e had ambiguous implica-
tions. In fact, one can show that if parameters are such that an increase in
e lowers initial p (the case we emphasized in section 9.2.2), then a higher
e
e (the relevant case for Argentina) would produce the same type of
impact on/? as an increase in e—it will go down, a movement opposite to
the one we want to be able to explain.
We would get a different implication in a world of price setters for
home goods and price takers for tradable goods. Imagine a situation
where213 Trying to Stabilize: The Case of Argentina
(30) />, = a£? + (l-
where Pt is the price set by firm / in the home goods sector. It is assumed
that Pit has to be determined prior to knowing the price of tradables (Et)
and the average for nontradables (Pt). The index e indicates expectations
at (t - 1), when prices are set. (This model is similar to the one discussed
in Phelps 1979, except that there money supply takes the place of E).
Now, assuming rationality, we get
(31) Pt = J
lQPitdi = P^
(where, for simplicity, we assume that each firm is a point in the interval
[0, 1]). Hence, by (30) and (31), we get
(32) Pt = E
et.
Therefore, if, say, £,< £f (i.e., authorities devalue by less than expected)
then PtIEt will be larger than 1, that is, the equilibrium value of PIE if E is
fully anticipated.
Consequently, according to this model, if all of a sudden individuals
expect that a devaluation will occur sometime in the future, but they do
not know exactly when, there will be an appreciation of the real exchange
rate as long as devaluation is not made effective. The model can even
explain a steady increase in observed {PIE) if, in the perception of
individuals, devaluation becomes more likely with the passage of time.
Notice that, if we superpose the assumption that wages are perfectly
flexible, the model implies full employment and excess capacity (or
unwanted inventory accumulation), which is not inconsistent with the
Argentine experience. If, in addition, we append the model with a
demand-for-money function like (3), we also find that the appreciation of
the real exchange rate would be accompanied by an accumulation of
reserves at the central bank.
Independently of whether unfulfilled expectations of the sort examined
above affect the ex post determination of the real exchange rate, there is
also an effect on the ex post real interest rate that appears to have played
an important role in the last stages of the Martinez de Hoz administra-
tion. Take, for instance, the first model discussed in this section (equa-
tions [25]-[29]). By using equation (28) and recalling that the solution
requires (pip)
6 = 0, the ex ante expected real interest rate would be i*.
However, again because ex post/? is a constant, PIP = e (the actual rate
of devaluation). Consequently, by equation (27) the ex post real rate of
interest is equal to i* + e
e - e.
Therefore, by simply making the expected rate of devaluation larger
than the actual we can increase the actual interest rate over the expected.
Various conditions existed to make this likely to happen during 1980. In
















































































Source: Same as table 9.1.
widespread belief that the peso was overvalued led people to think that
the economy was out of control of de Hoz's team, and that any reasonable
successor would most likely devalue to restore some kind of "equilib-
rium" parity. The second, and perhaps most crucial, factor that operated
during 1980 was the nomination (by the junta) of a new president (R.
Viola) whose term would start on March 29, 1981. It was immediately
transparent that Viola disagreed with de Hoz's policies, and to make
things worse, he made no clear policy statement before taking over,
except for saying that he supported the (loosely defined) basic principles
of the 1976 revolution (freer markets, etc.), but it was likely that there
would be changes in "instrumentation." This together with the percep-
tion that the peso was overvalued led to a belief of an imminent and
substantial devaluation (this is dramatically shown in table 9.7 for March
1981).
1
5 The effect on the real interest rate for the last stretch of the
Martinez de Hoz period agrees with the implication of the above theory
(see table 9.5).
9.3 Epilogue
The devaluation pressures by the end of the Martinez de Hoz period
were practically insurmountable. As indicated above, de Hoz was promp-
ted to make an unexpected 10 percent devaluation in February 1981. The
new administration, however, confirmed what almost everybody had
predicted by further devaluing the peso by 30 percent a few days after
taking the oath of office. The prefixed rate system was continued but it
did not stop the outflow of capital. As a consequence, another 30 percent
15. As indicated in note 5, the peso suffered an unannounced 10 percent devaluation in
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devaluation, this time highly unexpected, was carried out the first week of
June 1981. Credibility was lost, capital outflow gathered additional
momentum, and a few weeks later the government announced a "dual"
exchange rate system: a prefixed rate for most commercial transactions
and long-run capital flows; a floating rate for short-run capital and some
commercial transactions (like some nontraditional exports and tourism).
Taking into account the average of the floating rate for June, the upshot
of all this was that the peso was devalued by over 200 percent since
January 1981, in striking contrast with the plan of December 1978 that
had anticipated a completely fixed rate after March 1981. It is worth
noting, however, that over that period the price level (CPI) increased by
slightly less than 50 percent and that, for the first time since 1976, the rate
of unemployment appears to have overshot the 6 percent mark.
Like physicians, economists should learn from the catastrophes of
some economies to try to improve the welfare of many others. In this
light, the models discussed in this paper have to be seen as only tentative
explorations of a mysterious disease that will require many able re-
searchers to diagnose it adequately.
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Comment Herminio A. Blanco
The internal consistency of the first and second models presented by the
author is beyond dispute. However, since the empirical motivation of the
third model is that agents made a significant forecasting error in 1980, the
"natural assumption" made in equation (29) (i.e.,/? — p
e) is inappropri-
ate. Instead the formulation of a fully stochastic model is called for. Such
a model should specify if the forecasting error was fostered by an unex-
pected change in the parameters of the underlying stochastic processes,
or if it was generated under a stable structure.
My main comment centers around the validity of developing a series of
models to "capture" each of the highlights of the Argentine experience
during the 1976-1980 period. Is the author listing alternative hypotheses
to be tested in a step wise regression, or is he groping toward a general
model?
My general impression is that the answer would be negative to the first
question and affirmative to the second. If the author is trying to formulate
a general model, he should have developed the implications of each one
of the models for the whole period under consideration. Instead of
following this initial "testing" procedure, the author only considered the
capacity of each model to replicate a particular historical episode.
As a final comment, I would like to stress that one of the most
intriguing pieces of evidence presented in the historical background was
not incorporated in any of the models. What is the relation between the
collapse of the three major banks and the decrease in foreign exchange
reserves which occurred in 1980?
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Comment Ricardo Ffrench-Davis
The Argentine case offers an interesting example of a new set of eco-
nomic policies recently being implemented in several developing coun-
tries. (LDCs). The set includes the following among its most distinctive
features: a reform of the domestic financial market in the direction of
liberalizing interest rates and the allocation of credit and of reducing
reserve requirements; the freeing of capital flows; a trend toward a fixed
unified exchange rate; a generalized relaxation of price controls; the
demobilization of labor unions; a public sector increasingly passive on
economic matters; and, most often, an authoritarian regime. Actual
experiences in LDCs toward an "open economy" have tended to be
associated with "closed politics" and repressed social organizations.
This set of economic policies—frequently called orthodox, neocon-
servative, or free market experiments—is well illustrated by the eco-
nomic models implemented in the Southern Cone countries, especially
Argentina and Chile. They conform better than, for instance, South
Korea or Singapore, to a textbook "free market" model. Moreover,
Argentina (until mid-1980) and Chile (still by the end of 1981) were
exhibited by the supporters of these policies as highly successful and
promising cases.
The Southern Cone experiments do not begin from a steady state
situation. Actually, they are initiated in a framework characterized by
high and variable inflation, large fiscal budget deficits, arbitrary trade
restrictions, and a distorted price system. The Southern Cone experi-
ments are intended to "normalize" the domestic economies. But, in
contrast with previous stabilization programs, they have also been
directed to introduce "structural" changes in the economic organization
that was built in previous decades. It is obvious that the title of "market
economy" or free market is too vague and general to describe these new
experiments.
Guillermo Calvo takes one significant feature of the Argentine case,
which was the growing gap between domestic inflation and international
rates of inflation (plus variations of the exchange rate) that resulted,
between 1977 and 1980, as the rate of devaluation was reduced in the
search for a fixed exchange rate. This issue is also quite relevant for Chile,
where the formal implementation of a "monetarist approach to the
balance of payments" or an open-economy global monetarism has also
resulted in a significant appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Calvo sketches some of the relevant features of the implementation of
the model imposed in Argentina. Then he presents three models framed
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis is a researcher at Corporation de Investigaciones Economicas
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in a general-equilibrium, rational-expectations context. They are in-
tended to explain the real appreciation of the peso against the U.S.
dollar, which was close to 100 percent in the period discussed. Model 1
focuses on the impact of a portfolio shift by Argentinians from foreign
currency to domestic land; model 2 studies the effects of substitutability
between domestic and foreign monetary assets; and model 3 examines
the implications of the noncredibility of the official announcements with
respect to exchange rate policy.
Here, for the sake of brevity, I will make only two brief comments
related to the sketch of the implementation of the Argentine model, and
then I will refer briefly to Calvo's discussion of models 1 and 3.
Calvo asserts that the economic policy was not always clearly under-
stood by the public. He rightly says that this "lack of clarity" was partly
the result of the dismantling of long-inherited price distortions. But one
can go further by following the track of this fact. One can hypothesize
that even if the public were able to understand the policy, it might be
unable to identify correctly (a) the direction of changes in relative prices
and the corresponding reallocative signals, and (b) the range of feasible
trends in the effort to stabilize the price level. Many economists place in
these two implications a significant explanatory power of the low invest-
ment rates or the persistence of domestic inflation with a stagnant or
depressed economic activity (see, e.g., Ffrench-Davis 1979; Foxley 1980;
and Ramos 1978 on Chile's case). It is a very relevant question whether
the reduction of some (not all, of course) "distortions," especially in the
conjunctural framework characterizing the Southern Cone countries, has
been generating costs overwhelmingly larger than the present value of
potential benefits to be reaped sometime in the future.
Second, I want to touch on one point relating to restrictions on capital
movements. Calvo calls the maintenance, until July 1980, of the mini-
mum one-year period of permanence for capital inflows an imperfection.
It can be argued that some sort of intervention in capital movements
might be required to improve the performance of the market and to avoid
speculative flows. As Dornbusch (1981) puts it, "There is no reason
whatsoever to establish linkages to the world capital market for the
benefit of speculators," and imbalances "can as well be financed by
sterilized central bank intervention or by changes in public sector net
foreign assets." In fact, there seem to have been too many experiences in
Latin America disturbed by destabilizing capital flows. Free flows, rather
than discouraging the mismanagement of policies such as the exchange
rate, appear to foster it. That has been the case of the recent experiments
of Argentina and Chile: capital inflows larger than the actual current
account deficit have pressed for a clearly excessive appreciation of the
exchange rate; for a while, the process of appreciation has encouraged
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Now let us refer briefly to model 1. First, it must be recalled that Calvo
states clearly that the models have the potential to account for at least
some of the divergence between the actual and the long-run exchange
rates, but how much is an open question.
There has clearly been a demand shift from foreign currency to land.
(It was subsequently reversed in both countries.) The open questions are
how large has this shift been, and how significant is its effect on "wealth,"
the core variable in model 1; and then how strong is its transmission to the
price of nontradables (/?). In Argentina's case, we are dealing with
differences between the annual changes of CPI and of the exchange rate
(plus international inflation) as large as 80 percent (158 percent versus 80
percent, in average, for 1978-1979). And it is not a one-year phe-
nomenon, but it lasted for four years. I think that the strength of "inertia"
in inflation and the weakness of the capacity of the exchange rate either to
influence inflationary expectations or to influence directly the market of
nontradables, are notably more relevant as explanatory variables of the
persistently large net domestic inflation.
The boom of the price of land and of other forms of wealth have
probably been more significant in contributing to the diversion of invest-
ment and mental efforts from "productive" uses to "speculative" uses.
These problems of transition introduce complications in the return oip to
an "invariant steady state" and most probably modify to a significant
degree the long-run equilibrium.
Finally, just two comments in relation to model 3. First, disbelief in
preannounced exchange rate schedules, rather than the consequence of
the lack of clarity of the government, appears to be the result of the
increasing appreciation of the exchange rate and the subsequent effects
on the trade balance (Frenkel 1981). Both in Argentina and Chile evi-
dence seems to show that disbelief came after appreciation, not vice
versa.
Second, it is true that disbelief about the preannounced path for the
exchange rate, in some cases, may not have real effects. Calvo discusses
some interesting examples that illustrate this possibility. But that, for
sure, has not been the case of Argentina and Chile in their recent
experiments. The data suggest that, as a consequence, real interest rates
became more unstable, the spread between domestic and foreign interest
rates increased, and investment in tradables was discouraged. It is one
thing to know that the real exchange rate will be devalued sometime and
another to know when it will be done. The actual market exchange rate is
a factor that has been affecting the short-run profitability of producers of
tradables and actually pushing many to bankruptcy. The actual working
of capital markets is not guided by distant horizons, particularly after
the sort of financial reforms that have been implemented with these
experiments.220 Guillermo A. Calvo
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